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Wonderful Examples, but Let’s not Close
Our Eyes
David J. Hand
Abstract. The papers in this collection are superb illustrations of the
power of modern Bayesian methods. They give examples of problems
which are well suited to being tackled using such methods, but one
must not lose sight of the merits of having multiple different strategies
and tools in one’s inferential armoury.
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Pearson hypothesis testing, schools of inference.
Space prohibits me from making specific com-
ments on each of these informative and thought-
provoking papers—they each merit an extended dis-
cussion in their own right. Instead, I will make some
general comments about the collection.
The papers provide marvelous examples of the
power of modern statistics and, in particular, of
the power of modern Bayesian methods. The ad-
jective “modern” here is intended mainly to indi-
cate that it is the power of the computer which has
made practical solutions such as those illustrated
in these papers. But I have to ask, is the emphasis
on “Bayesian” necessary? That is, do we need fur-
ther demonstrations aimed at promoting the mer-
its of Bayesian methods? Surely the case is proven:
Bayesian methods are very well suited to tackling
many problems, leading to solutions which would
be hard to arrive at by alternative methods.
The examples in this special issue were selected
first by the authors, who decided what to write
about, and, then, second by the editors, in deciding
the extent to which the articles conformed to their
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desiderata of being Bayesian success stories: that
they “present actual data processing stories where
a non-Bayesian solution would have failed or pro-
duced suboptimal results.” In a way I think this is
unfortunate. I am certainly convinced of the power
of Bayesian inference for tackling many problems,
but the generality and power of the method is not
really demonstrated by a collection specifically se-
lected on the grounds that this approach works and
others fail. To take just one example, choosing prob-
lems which would be difficult to attack using the
Neyman–Pearson hypothesis testing strategy would
not be a convincing demonstration of a weakness of
that approach if those problems lay outside the class
that approach was designed to attack. One of the
basic premises of science is that you must not select
the data points which support your theory, discard-
ing those which do not. In fact, on the contrary, one
should test one’s theory by challenging it with tough
problems or new observations. (This contrasts with
political party rallies, where the candidates speak
to a cheering audience of those who already support
them.) So the fact that the articles in this collec-
tion provide wonderful stories illustrating the power
of modern Bayesian methods is rather tarnished by
the one-sidedness of the story. If I wasn’t already
convinced of the power of the Bayesian paradigm, I
might be tempted to wonder if there was too much
protestation going on.
Or perhaps, if one is going to have a collection of
papers demonstrating the power of one particular in-
ferential school, then, in the journalistic spirit of bal-
anced reporting, we should invite a series of similar
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articles which “present actual data processing sto-
ries where a nonfrequentist/nonlikelihood/non-[fill
in your favorite school of inference] solution would
have failed or produced suboptimal results.” Or even
examples of the power of each of the other 46655 dif-
ferent varieties of Bayesian approach (Good, 1971).
The editors emphasized that they were not look-
ing for “argumentative rehashes of the Bayesian ver-
sus frequentist debate.” I can only commend them
on that. On the other hand, times move on, ideas
develop, and understanding deepens, so while “ar-
gumentative rehashes” might not be desirable, re-
examination from a more sophisticated perspective
might be. The editors went on to say “we the edi-
tors are convinced of the generic appeal of ‘doing it
Bayes’ way,’ while non-Bayesians are convinced of
the opposite.” I think this is a slightly unfortunate
phrasing. I would (admittedly, perhaps naively) like
to think that any modern statistician would look at
each problem on its merits, and decide what “way”
was best suited to tackle that problem. I am always
a little uncomfortable when I hear about “the one
true way” of looking at things.
An interesting question, perhaps in part socio-
logical, is why different scientific communities tend
to favor different schools of inference. Astronomers
favor Bayesian methods, particle physicists and
psychologists seem to favor frequentist methods.
Is there something about these different domains
which makes them more amenable to attack by dif-
ferent approaches?
In general, when building statistical models, we
must not forget that the aim is to understand some-
thing about the real world. Or predict, choose an
action, make a decision, summarize evidence, and
so on, but always about the real world, not an ab-
stract mathematical world: our models are not the
reality—a point well made by George Box in his
oft-cited remark that “all models are wrong, but
some are useful” (Box, 1979). So, likewise, if differ-
ent models suit different purposes, why should we
expect one approach to inference to be universally
applicable? The internal mathematical coherence of
Bayesian methods is very attractive, but it must
not be allowed to take priority over the ultimate
aim, which is to say something about the reality
we are studying. As Albert Einstein put it: “as far
as the propositions of mathematics refer to reality,
they are not certain; and as far as they are certain,
they do not refer to reality.” (Einstein, 1921). As
an aside, there is also the question of what exactly
is meant by “Bayesian.” Cox and Donnelly [(2011),
page 144] remark that “the word Bayesian, however,
became ever more widely used, sometimes represent-
ing a regression to the older usage of ‘flat’ prior dis-
tributions supposedly representing initial ignorance,
sometimes meaning models in which the parameters
of interest are regarded as random variables and oc-
casionally meaning little more than that the laws of
probability are somewhere invoked.”
Turning to the papers themselves, the Bayesian
approach to statistics, with its interpretation of pa-
rameters as random variables, has the merit of for-
mulating everything in a consistent manner. Instead
of trying to fit together objects of various different
kinds, one merely has a single common type of brick
to use, which certainly makes life easier. In partic-
ular, this means that very elaborate models can be
handled with relative ease. As is elegantly demon-
strated in the papers, although the model formula-
tion requires deep and careful thought, at some level
the Bayesian procedure is attractively straightfor-
ward.
On the basis of these papers, one can certainly
see the sorts of problems which lend themselves to
attack by Bayesian methods and which are difficult
to approach in other ways. Common characteristics
seem to be complex models, fragmentary and indi-
rect evidence, the task being evidence synthesis or
explicitly to develop a probability distribution, and
so on. Each of these are tough problems to cope
with, and one should be reassured that statisticians
now have the tools to tackle them.
But reassurance should not drift into compla-
cency. When presented with fragmentary evidence,
for example, one should proceed with caution. In
such circumstances, the opportunity for undetected
selection bias is considerable. Assumptions about
the missing data mechanism may be untestable, per-
haps even unnoticed. Data can be missing only in
the context of a larger model, and one might not
have any idea about what model might be suitable.
Having an inferential strategy which can cope with
such problems should not tempt one to ignore the
fact that they are there, along with the consequent
qualifications and reservations about the conclusions
drawn.
Likewise, the power of Bayesian methods to han-
dle complex models is very exciting. Many prob-
lems statisticians are asked to tackle are complex,
and a complex model is necessary. So the fact that
we statisticians now have a paradigm which will al-
low us to tackle increasingly complex models is cer-
tainly to be applauded. But I do have this nagging
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feeling that sometimes a more approximate solution
might be more suitable. On the one hand, very elab-
orate models have many ways to be misspecified,
and, on the other, statisticians rarely work on prac-
tical problems in isolation, but typically in conjunc-
tion with domain experts in the area being explored.
The statistician brings statistical expertise, but at
the end of it all the answer must be comprehensible
to the other scientists: one aspect of a model be-
ing “useful,” to use Box’s word, is that it should be
comprehensible. And there are other related aspects.
Timeliness, a corollary of simplicity, is one. I am re-
minded of a comment made by David Lawrence of
Citicorp: “In one business, we waited more than 20
months for a professor of statistics to come up with
the ‘Cadillac’ of scoring systems, while all the busi-
ness needed was a ‘Chevrolet’ that would work.”
(Lawrence, 1984, page 55).
You will see that I am trying to argue the case
of balance. Despite that, and however you look at
it, the editors are to be congratulated on collat-
ing a superb collection of papers illustrating the
power of modern statistics to handle complex prob-
lems. Moreover, within the remit of what they set
out to do—to demonstrate the power of modern
Bayesian methods—they certainly succeeded. I shall
definitely draw the attention of my students to this
excellent collection of articles.
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